

**NADIA'S
INITIATIVE**

IN THE AFTERMATH OF GENOCIDE

Report on the Status of Sinjar

2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is the result of collaboration among many individuals and institutions. The editorial and research team thank all who gave so willingly of their time and expertise, foremost the Yazidi families who participated in this work, but also a number of other vital contributors:

ADVISORY BOARD

Nadia Murad, Founder of Nadia's Initiative
Kerry Proper, Executive Board Member of Nadia's Initiative
Elizabeth Schaeffer Brown, Executive Board Member of Nadia's Initiative
Abid Shamdeen, Executive Board Member of Nadia's Initiative

Numerous NGOs, U.N. agencies, and humanitarian aid professionals in Iraq and Kurdistan also provided guidance and feedback for this report.

REPORT TEAM

Amber Webb, lead researcher/principle author

Melanie Baker, data and analytics
Kenglin Lai, data and analytics
Sulaiman Jameel, survey enumerator co-lead
Faris Mishko, survey enumerator co-lead



Special thanks to the team at Yazda for assisting with the coordination of this report.

LAYOUT AND DESIGN

Jens Robert Janke | www.jensrobertjanke.com

PHOTOGRAPHY

Amber Webb, Jens Robert Janke, and the Yazda Documentation Team.
Images should not be reproduced without authorization.

The views and interpretation listed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of Nadia's Initiative. To protect the identities of those who participated in the research, all names have been changed and specific locations withheld.

For more information please visit www.nadiasinitiative.org.

FOREWORD

On August 3rd, 2014 the world endured yet another genocide. In the hours just before sunrise, my village and many others in the region of Sinjar, Iraq came under attack by the Islamic State. That morning, IS militants began a campaign of ethnic cleansing to eradicate Yazidis from existence. In mere hours, many friends and family members perished before my eyes. The rest of us, unable to flee, were taken as prisoners and endured unspeakable acts of violence.

On that day, our lives changed forever. Thousands were needlessly killed and the vast majority of my people were forced from our homeland, a place we had lived peacefully for centuries. Today our struggle continues as Yazidis remain missing, women are still enslaved, and our villages and towns have been reduced to rubble leaving many to languish in camps and impoverished conditions.

I continue to fight against the Islamic State to bring justice for their crimes against humanity. This moment must be remembered to ensure genocide no longer has a place in this world. Yet as we reflect back, we must also look forward. With justice must come progress. Therefore, I am continuing my advocacy to condemn the Islamic State but I am also dedicating much of the work of Nadia's Initiative to looking to the future, rebuilding my homeland, and creating a peaceful Iraq. It is time our crisis comes to an end.

I hope you will join me in establishing the Sinjar Action Fund to begin steps towards rebuilding Yazidi communities. We must restore peace and stability to the region, which can only occur by strengthening networks of education, healthcare, livelihoods, and more. I hope this report invokes a call to action to preserve and promote our collective humanity. I ask that you support the re-development of Sinjar to allow Yazidis to finally return home and heal from this tragedy.



With Gratitude,

Nadia Murad


Human Rights Activist & Founder of Nadia's Initiative

ACRONYMS

DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, & Rehabilitation
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization (of the U.N.)
FFES	Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilization
FFIS	Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender Based Violence
HoH	Head of Household
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
NFIs	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PDS	Public Distribution System
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary.....	1
PART I	
1.1 Introduction.....	5
1.2 Background.....	6
Genocide and the Crisis of 2014.....	7
Aftermath of 2014: Continuation of Crisis.....	9
1.3 Problem Statement.....	13
1.4 Sinjar Area Profile.....	13
1.5 Humanitarian Access.....	15
1.6 Methodology.....	16
Limitations of the research.....	18
Information gaps and needs.....	19
PART II	
2.1 Livelihood & Food Security.....	20
Key Obstacles to Improvements.....	25
2.2 Shelter & NFIs.....	27
Key Obstacles to Improvements.....	31
2.3 Education.....	33
Key Obstacles to Improvements.....	37
2.4 Health.....	39
Key Obstacles to Improvements.....	43
2.5 Infrastructure.....	44
Key Obstacles to Improvements.....	47
2.6 Protection.....	48
PART III	
3.1 Recommendations.....	51
Livelihood & Food Security.....	53
Shelter & NFIs.....	54
Education.....	55
Health.....	56
Infrastructure.....	57
Protection.....	58
3.2 Conclusion.....	59
ANNEX I	
Cost Estimates on Re-Development.....	61
ANNEX II	
The Sinjar Action Fund (SAF).....	63





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The status of Sinjar, Iraq remains distressing more than 3.5 years after the crisis with the Islamic State (IS) began. In August 2014, IS initiated a campaign of genocide and mass destruction against the Yazidis, a religious minority that has lived in Sinjar for centuries. The conflict drove hundreds of thousands of people to flee and devastated much of the region.

Years into the crisis, the vast majority of Yazidis continue to live in IDP camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) with few options to return to their damaged homeland. Although Sinjar is now stable, aid for rebuilding has been slow and circumstances for resettlement are discouraging. Consequently, the Yazidi community lives in a transitory state, unable to go home and uncertain for their future.

After multiple years of conflict and occupation, parts of Sinjar are completely demolished while other areas survived with limited damage. Particularly the north and south show a stark divide. The

northern side of Sinjar was liberated within months of the initial attacks by IS. As a result, many homes and structures are still in good condition and the area has been able to support a small return of the population (approximately 15-20% of IDPs have returned). Alternatively, the south side suffered a much longer period of occupation. IS destroyed most towns and villages and left land mines and other dangers before they retreated. Therefore, for purposes of this report, research into the status of Sinjar (more specifically, resettlement and re-development opportunities) has focused primarily on the northern areas where the situation is more viable for a return of the population. Future research should examine the situation in the southern areas more deeply once it is cleared for safe returns.

The report is divided into three parts. Part I provides an introduction and offers context on the crisis. Part II elaborates on the situation in Sinjar and focuses on six “sectors of concern” important for stabilizing and re-developing the region. The six sectors include 1. Livelihoods & Food Security, 2. Shelter & NFIs, 3. Education, 4. Health, 5. Infrastructure, and 6. Protection. Part III gives broad recommendations for assistance moving forward.

BELOW


Yazidi children on Sinjar Mountain



The data collected for this report is both qualitative and quantitative. During analysis, findings were consolidated into a “severity index” to display levels of need. Each of the six sectors are represented by a severity index to show the intensity of needs across communities. Additionally, an overall severity index is provided below to display areas of most concern.

In summary, almost all sectors addressed for this report rank as a major to critical problem. According to the overall severity index, the education sector requires the most immediate assistance with communities describing the situation for schools as severe. Needs related to shelter & NFIs are also reported as a major concern with most communities expressing immense damage to homes. Although education and shelter/NFIs rank highest on the severity index, all sectors require assistance with most falling into categories of moderate to major needs.

Aside from the severity indices, broad issues and key obstacles are elaborated on in the report (and condensed in this section to summarize). These issues and obstacles explain why resettlement has been challenging over the last few years. Particularly, access issues have continually inhibited development efforts.



Lastly, the report provides key recommendations moving forward. Through interviews, focus groups, and an analysis of research findings, specific targets for re-development were defined. Such targets include a fund for damaged homes, salaries for teachers, mobile medical units in underserved areas, and more. The recommendations provided in this report should be accompanied with further analysis as development/resettlement efforts proceed.

TABLE 1.1

Overall severity index displaying the intensity of need in each sector

	Borek	Dehola	Hardan	Sinuni	Khanasor	Degure	Gulhbal	Zorava	Adeka Village	Useva Village	Bakira Village
Livelihoods & Food Security	2.5	2.66	3.16	2.33	2.66	3.16	2.83	3.0	3.0	2.83	3.0
Shelter & NFIs	4.2	4	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.2	4	4.2	4	3	2.8
Education	4.8	5.2	5	4	5	4.8	5.2	4.4	4.4	5.6	5.25
Health	3.2	3.2	5.4	3.2	3.4	4	3.2	4.2	3.8	4.4	4.8
Infrastructure	3	3.4	4.25	3.5	3.75	4.25	4.25	4	3.25	4.25	3.5
Protection	3.8	3.4	3.4	3.8	3.6	4.2	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.6

	BROAD ISSUES	KEY OBSTACLES	RECOMMENDATIONS
LIVELIHOODS & FOOD SECURITY	<p>People can access food but current methods are unsustainable</p> <p>Income generation is inconsistent and insufficient to support families</p>	<p>Important access roads have been closed, limiting the transport of supplies/goods into the region</p> <p>Humanitarian access is limited and returnees do not receive much support</p> <p>The agricultural sector has been devastated</p>	<p>Agricultural redevelopment, including irrigation systems, farm equipment, etc.</p> <p>Establishing more markets, especially in villages</p>
SHELTER & NFIS	<p>Half of all homes are in need of repair</p> <p>IDPs from the south side are inhabiting homes in the north</p>	<p>Limited availability of rebuilding materials</p> <p>Heightened poverty and limitations of financial resources</p> <p>Land tenure issues (including IDP 'squatting rights')</p>	<p>Financial assistance for the 3000 damaged homes</p> <p>Temporary shelter for IDPs</p>
EDUCATION	<p>Without education, it is difficult to address child wellbeing</p> <p>A breakdown of education may produce long term instability</p>	<p>Many school buildings are damaged and children must walk far</p> <p>Teacher salaries and trainings are generally non-existent</p> <p>There are multiple factors increasing the rate of out of school children such as recruitment to militias</p>	<p>Rebuilding of 31 schools (that have remained closed without assistance)</p> <p>Providing teacher salaries in full for one year and phase out in year two</p> <p>DDR programs for youth</p> <p>Ensuring schools are officially sanctioned</p>
HEALTH	<p>Health has historically been declining in the region</p> <p>Healthcare has never been sufficient but people are in need more than ever</p>	<p>Government policies restrict the supply of medicine</p> <p>Specialized care is unavailable (surgery, pediatrics, etc.)</p> <p>Women's health services are often unavailable</p> <p>Electricity and water supply problems</p> <p>Transportation challenges to medical facilities</p>	<p>Hiring of key specialized staff in women's care, surgery, pediatrics, etc.</p> <p>Construction of a more comprehensive hospital in the region</p> <p>Addition of two mobile medical units</p>
INFRASTRUCTURE	<p>Electricity and water resources are weak and cannot support the population</p>	<p>Developing sustainable solutions</p>	<p>Continuation of UNDP's electricity project</p> <p>Development of a comprehensive water program or boreholes</p>
PROTECTION	<p>Protection issues are not well integrated into aid responses</p>	<p>More info is needed to better understand obstacles</p>	<p>Establishing child nutrition programs</p> <p>De-mining campaigns</p> <p>Expansion of social work programs</p>

Part I

1.1 Introduction

For nearly a half century, Iraq has experienced ongoing conflicts that have caused severe destruction and under-development. Internal and external warfare have taken a heavy toll on citizens leaving many in need of immediate and long-term assistance. Violence, sanctions, insecurity, and economic stagnation have inhibited progress while ethno-religious tensions and discrimination have intensified violence over the years. An accumulation of factors has resulted in deteriorating conditions in much of the country. Without sustainable solutions, Iraq will continue to struggle towards achieving lasting peace and stability.

Particularly, Iraq's minorities have experienced consistent challenges to their security and livelihoods. While the country at large remains in a fragile state, the situation for minorities like Yazidis, Christians, Shabaks, etc. has been especially distressing. Overtime, these minorities have experienced extreme persecution leading to campaigns of genocide and mass destruction by extremist groups. The invasion of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014 and their violent declaration of a caliphate, which killed and enslaved thousands, poignantly echoes this point. These minorities continue to emerge from crisis and need both protection and aid to re-establish their

communities. Recent violence has made it clear that ethno-religious minorities continue to be under threat in Iraq and require comprehensive assistance to return to homelands devastated by years of conflict.

This report focuses on the situation for the Yazidi minority and their attempt to return to their native region of Sinjar after more than three years of displacement. It provides an assessment of community needs for redevelopment of the region following the expulsion of the Islamic State (IS) in 2017 and conveys recommendations moving forward. For the Yazidi minority to re-establish life in Sinjar, a multi-sector response is necessary to ensure sustainable solutions, stability, and the safeguarding of human rights now and into the future.

1.2 Background

Yazidis represent a prominent minority in Iraq and have historically resided in the northwestern region of the country along the Syrian border. The Yazidi population was estimated to be just over 500,000¹ in the period prior to 2014. Since ancient times, this minority has come under attack for their beliefs, often taking refuge on Sinjar Mountain. Targeted killings of Yazidis date back as far as the Ottoman Empire and began to increase in frequency in 2007 when bus hijackings and vehicle bombings conducted by suspected Al Qaeda militants left hundreds dead or injured². In both past and recent history, narrow acceptance of Yazidi beliefs and misinterpretation of the religion have frequently made this minority the target of ongoing violence and discrimination. At no point in history has this been more evident than the persecution by the Islamic State beginning in August 2014.

¹ Iraq Food Security Cluster. August 2017. Sinjar Assessment: FSC Partners Report.

² The Scotsman. 2007. Al Qaeda blamed for Yazidi Carnage.



” *We ran to the mountain when Daesh came. We thought help would come soon but we were alone for almost a week. We had no food or water. Sometimes planes would drop supplies to us and my brothers, sister and I would run to collect it. But after many days in the sun and heat they ran out of energy. So it became my job to find enough water for all of us to survive.*

ADIBA, 12 YEAR OLD GIRL

GENOCIDE AND THE CRISIS OF 2014

On August 3, 2014, Yazidis in Sinjar came under attack by the Islamic State (IS). IS fighters invaded hundreds of towns and villages forcing most of the population (approx. 400,000³ people) to flee to neighboring Kurdistan and other areas of Iraq, while an estimated 40,000-50,000 people fled to the top of Mount Sinjar⁴. Thousands of Yazidis were also killed or taken captive to Mosul and Syria.

Those able to flee from the violence moved primarily into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The rapid influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) created immense challenges for the government and aid organizations alike. In the initial days of the crisis, food, shelter, and essential provisions were in limited supply causing many Yazidis to move between towns and cities in search of help. Hundreds of thousands of IDPs were desperate to find assistance and were eventually relocated to camps after the international community had mobilized aid.

For Yazidis besieged on the mountain, they endured extreme conditions with temperatures consistently reaching 45+ degrees Celsius, with little access to food, water, or shelter. Multiple days on the mountain in such dire conditions resulted in the deaths of hundreds⁵ including many children⁶. Foreign governments eventually intervened with humanitarian supplies and airstrikes against IS, but many lives were already lost. On August 9th, nearly a week into the crisis, a coalition of forces were able to forge a corridor from Mount Sinjar into Syria enabling tens of thousands to escape the mountain and enclosing IS threat.

³ Yazda. 2016. Report on the Mass Graves of Yazidis Killed by the Islamic State Organization or Local Affiliates On or After August 3, 2014.

⁴ Iraq Food Security Cluster. August 2017. Sinjar Assessment: FSC Partners Report.

⁵ Chulov, M. 2014. 40,000 Iraqis stranded on mountain as Isis jihadists threaten death. The Guardian.

⁶ Gidda, M. 2014. Everything you need to know about the Yazidis. Time Magazine.

The Yazidis who were captured by the Islamic State endured mass killings, forced conversions, abduction, sexual abuse, and enslavement. Typically, captured Yazidis were separated by gender with men and older boys systematically slaughtered and left in mass graves. Some reports claim up to 5000 men killed in August of 2014⁷. It is estimated that over 3,200 women and children⁸ were also abducted and taken as prisoners to Mosul and Syria. Some reports raise that number to 5000–7000 abductees⁹. Enslaved women and girls endured severe and prolonged sexual abuse while pre-pubescent boys were indoctrinated with violent ideologies and forced to serve alongside IS militants.

⁷ The Telegraph. 2016. ISIL carried out massacres and mass sexual enslavement of Yazidis, UN confirms.

⁸ UN Human Rights Council. 2016. They came to destroy: ISIS crimes against the Yazidis.

⁹ Yazda

” *When Daesh came they made all the boys roll up our pants and show them our legs. If we had hair then they sent us with our fathers. If we didn't they let us stay with our mothers. I was lucky to stay with my mother. Daesh killed all the men and left them in a grave.*

ATYAS, 14 YEAR OLD BOY



¹⁰ The Guardian. [ND]. MPs unanimously declare Yazidis and Christians victims of ISIS genocide

RIGHT

Children memorialize the missing Yazidis

The campaign of violence against the Yazidi community has been declared genocide by multiple country governments and the United Nations. In 2016, the U.N. Independent International Commission of Inquiry determined that ISIS' violence against the Yazidis constitutes a case of genocide, defined by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In the same year, the U.S. government officially asserted the same judgment, concurring with the European parliament and Council of Europe's reviews¹⁰.



¹¹ The south side of Sinjar mountain remained under IS control until the Iraqi government declared victory in summer 2017

AFTERMATH OF 2014: CONTINUATION OF CRISIS

By the end of 2014, the northern half of Sinjar was liberated from the Islamic State. IS militants were forced to retreat to strongholds in Syria, Mosul, and the south side of Sinjar Mountain¹¹. Unfortunately, liberation of the northern areas did not elicit a mass migration back to the region for reasons including: 1. Yazidis maintained skepticism for security, 2. the area needed to be assessed and cleared of land mines, 3. political circumstances barred Yazidis from taking rebuilding materials and necessary goods through checkpoints, and 4. half of the communities were damaged.

The impact of IS severely deteriorated security in Sinjar, yet even after liberation, Yazidis have struggled to view their homeland as safe. Following the expulsion of IS from the north side in 2014, authority over the region has remained contentious leading to further feelings of insecurity. International, national, and local conflicts have impacted the area. Internationally, the presence of Turkish PKK militias in Sinjar has created problems with the

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Nationally, tensions between the Iraqi central government in Baghdad and Kurdish regional government in Erbil over who maintains control of the region has grown increasingly problematic, and locally a variety of militias (YPG, YBS, PKK, PUK, KDP, etc.) now operate with control over various areas north of the mountain.

The political tensions and swelling of militias have increased Yazidis' skepticism to return to a secure homeland. The perpetuation of armed groups has done little to increase feelings of safety important for migration from camps back to Sinjar. According to the U.N., lack of security in the area is the main reason not to return for 37% of interviewed IDPs. An additional 47% remain displaced because they enjoy better security in the area of displacement¹².


The necessity to clear land mines has also inhibited re-settlement, particularly on the south side of the mountain. During the occupation of IS, numerous mines were hidden in the Sinjar region. Since 2015, de-mining campaigns by MAG¹³ have been effective in ridding parts of the region of Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs) but work still remains. The south side of the mountain has experienced a far greater number of land mines; however, the north side also had to be de-mined and assessed for safety—serving to limit the return of Yazidis in the early days of liberation. Although the south side of the mountain is still overwhelmed by UXOs, the north side has been declared safe for re-settlement.

¹² IOM. 2017. Obstacles to Return in Retaken Areas of Iraq.

¹³ Mines Advisory Group

BELOW

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in a field



¹⁴ Human Rights Watch. 2016.
Iraq: KRG Restrictions Harm
Yezidi Recovery.

Further exacerbating the situation, immigration has been inhibited by government policies limiting the movement of goods into the region. Multiple checkpoints prohibit Yazidi returnees from being able to transport necessary materials (e.g. building materials, bulk items, etc.) into Sinjar. These materials are essential for reconstructing homes, schools, hospitals, and businesses. Prominent human rights organizations have made calls to question these restrictions¹⁴ but nonetheless the checkpoints administered primarily by the KRG have slowed re-development of the region.

Lastly, infrastructure has been heavily damaged throughout Sinjar. Prior to 2014, the region experienced limited access to such services as electricity and water but conditions were strong enough to support the population. In the aftermath of IS, damage to infrastructure has been so severe that the majority of returnees struggle to acquire basic services and the current situation could not support a mass migration of Yazidis from camps to home.

” *I escaped from Daesh in 2016. For the first few months that they had us, they kept us in an underground prison. We never knew what time of day it was. We slept a lot there. Some people died of dehydration because they would only feed us a piece of cheese and bread with a little bit of water each day. It wasn't enough. After that I was sold to a family in Syria. Within a year and a half I had been sold four more times.*

Eventually I escaped with the help of a smuggler. I made it back to Iraq and was reunited with my family. Since my village was still occupied by Daesh we had to live in a camp. I was finally free but I couldn't go home to Sinjar. Instead I sleep in a tent and we have broken toilets and sometimes no electricity. I survived Daesh to live here.

SHIREEN, YOUNG WOMAN



The Sinjar region remains in crisis and numerous obstacles hinder re-development. Many of these problems could be addressed with aid programs/assistance but humanitarian access has been limited. Government restrictions (i.e. limited permission for NGOs to operate in Sinjar) and attention to the Mosul crisis (i.e. redirection of resources during the military operation) have deterred organizations and aid agencies from giving proper assistance to Sinjar. Consequently, the majority of Yazidis remain in camp settings in KRI. Almost 300,000 Yazidis now reside in camps¹⁵. It is estimated that a large portion of the displaced population has also begun to migrate internationally. The Yazidi Affairs Office of the Kurdistan Regional Government states that approximately 90,000 Yazidis have left and moved to countries like the United States, Canada and Germany¹⁶.

The crisis that began on August 3, 2014 persists. Hundreds of thousands of Yazidis continue to reside in camps, returnees to Sinjar have low access to humanitarian support, and the several thousand Yazidis still missing or held by the Islamic State constitute an “ongoing genocide” according to the United Nations¹⁷. A permanent solution is yet to be found leaving the Yazidi community in a transitory state.

¹⁵ UNHABITAT. 2015. Emerging Land Tenure Issues Among Displaced Yazidis from Sinjar.

¹⁶ Stoter, B. [2017]. For many of Iraq’s Yazidis, going home is not an option.

¹⁷ U.N. Human Rights Council. 2016. “They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis.

1.3 Problem Statement

Yazidis in Iraq need comprehensive assistance to return to their homeland in Sinjar. The region has been devastated by conflict and years of neglect. Although the northern side of Sinjar Mountain has been open for resettlement since its liberation in December 2014, without assurances of safety and re-development assistance, Yazidis have been hesitant to return. Overtime, the security situation has improved and although Sinjar (like much of Iraq) remains fragile it has not been involved in any major conflicts since 2014 and is extremely viable for re-settlement. Yazidis are prepared to return home if support can be given for: reconstruction of homes/buildings, rehabilitation of infrastructure/the agricultural sector/government services, and a revival of the regional economy.

1.4 Sinjar Area Profile

Sinjar is located in the Ninewa Governorate in northwestern Iraq. It has been recognized by the United Nations as existing under the authority of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, although the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has periodically maintained de facto control. The pre-crisis population is listed at 93,000 households, or 558,000 individuals according to statistics provided by local officials¹⁸. This number encompasses both the north and south side of the mountain prior to 2014.

Sinjar has historically been divided into two parts (north and south) split by a 100-kilometer long mountain that cuts through the otherwise flat lands of western Iraq. The north and south of the mountain are culturally and linguistically similar. Yazidis in Sinjar are relatively homogenous compared to Yazidis outside the region in the eastern Ninewa plain (e.g. Bashiqa, Bahzani).

For purposes of this report, the north and south are distinguished from one another due to vastly different levels of destruction by the Islamic State. The north side was liberated within months of the IS attacks, whereas the south side endured almost three years of occupation. Consequently, the north side has become a much more viable region for immediate redevelopment given the lesser extent of damage by IS. Additionally, many safety concerns still exist on the south side of the mountain (land mines, hidden

¹⁸ Iraq Food Security Cluster. August 2017. Sinjar Assessment: FSC Partners Report.

bombs, resurgent violence) rendering most areas uninhabitable until these issues are addressed. Therefore, this report focuses on assessing only the needs of the north side of Sinjar mountain. Further assessment of the south side will be required in the future.

The north side of Sinjar encompasses eight “collectives” that are located off the main highway running parallel to the mountain. Collectives are communities created by Saddam Hussein to consolidate Yazidi villages during the oppressive process of “Arabization” in the 1970s. These collectives became population hubs – most Yazidis (in the north) lived in the eight established collectives, although a sizeable population also lived on farms or smaller villages at the base of the mountain. The following are the collectives from east to west: Khanasor, Sinuni, Degure, Dehola, Borek, Zorava, Gulbal, Hardan.

TABLE 1.2

The table displays the rate of return in each collective north of Sinjar Mountain

COLLECTIVE	PRE-CRISIS POPULATION	CURRENT POPULATION
Khanasor	31,161	7,917
Sinuni	16,789	19,894
Degure	23,439	5,565
Dehola	13,516	5,488
Borek	18,259	15,519
Zorava	7,831	5,054
Gulbal	13,281	4,340
Hardan	2,100	357
Total	126,376	64,134

**Approximately half of the population in the collectives on the north side of the mountain has returned home. No data is available for surrounding villages. Sinuni sub-district office, 2018.*

Regarding the growth of the returnee population, the region has seen slow but steadily rising numbers. Since 2014, Yazidis have begun re-inhabiting Sinjar although the rate of return has sometimes fluctuated. No statistics are available for 2015 but an assessment conducted in February 2016, counted approximately 25,000 returnees, with an increase in 2017 to more than 35,000¹⁹. Presently, there are approximately 60,000-70,000 returnees now residing in Sinjar.

¹⁹ Sinuni Sub-District Mayor’s Office

1.5 Humanitarian Access

Since 2014, humanitarian access to Sinjar has been limited. In the initial period of crisis the security situation severely constrained agencies from providing aid to the region. After the northern areas were liberated and began to stabilize, the political context created new challenges. Some NGOs reported difficulty in gaining permissions to work in Sinjar. In addition, government checkpoints to enter the region were heavily restrictive (frequently forbidding the transfer of medicines, material aid and entry of foreign aid workers). Nonetheless, a few NGOs have managed assistance. The aid provided has been critical to the health and wellbeing of the population but limited in scope with comparison to work occurring in KRI and other areas of Iraq. Lastly, the Mosul operation that ran from fall 2016 to summer 2017 consumed many NGO resources and attention to needs in Sinjar waned. The following is a list of international aid agencies that have worked or are actively working in Sinjar as of January 2018. The list is not exhaustive but conveys an overview of the aid network present in the region.

TABLE 1.3

Organizations that have provided aid in Sinjar since 2014 (some inconsistently)

ORGANIZATION	COUNTRY	ACTIVITIES
MEDAIR	Switzerland	Shelter, NFIs
JEN	Japan	Shelter
Mission East	Denmark	NFIs
Médecins du Monde	France	Health
UNICEF	Inter-governmental	Education, Protection
DORCAS	The Netherlands	Shelter, NFIs
Yazda	United States	Education, Health, Economic Development
Samaritan's Purse	United States	Infrastructure, Shelter, NFIs
Norwegian Church Aid	Norway	Health, Protection
Save the Children	Global	Education, WASH
UNHABITAT	Global	Shelter
UNHCR	Global	Clothing, Shelter, NFIs, cash assistance
IOM	Global	Clothing, Shelter, NFIs, cash assistance
UNICEF	Global	Education



1.6 Methodology

Conditions in Sinjar and consequent access restrictions severely reduce the operational environment for international development and humanitarian aid activities, including facilitation of this assessment. The majority of quantitative data was collected in the target region of Sinjar by a local team of enumerators, with remote oversight from the lead researcher in the neighboring Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Alternatively qualitative data was collected in camp settings outside of Sinjar due to restrictions on foreigner researchers that made access to the region difficult. To accommodate challenges of access, qualitative data was collected from individuals who regularly travel between Sinjar and camps (with the intent of transitioning home) and who identified as having thorough knowledge of the region. Additional challenges can be found in the limitation section. Nonetheless, although conditions were difficult the data gathered provides a robust picture of the situation for Yazidis in Sinjar.

In total six enumerators (all male), administered the surveys. Enumerators with previous experience were selected so that a basic orientation to the assessment was sufficient to accomplish the work. All enumerators were local and lived or had lived in the target region. Surveys elicited the majority of quantitative data for this report.

The lead researcher was tasked with gathering data through interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs), with assistance from a local translator. The lead researcher, a foreign female, had lived and worked extensively in Iraq. Interviews and FGDs elicited the qualitative data necessary for this project.

The primary data collection tools included a questionnaire that provided key information on how the Yazidi community views the needs and priorities of re-development in Sinjar. The survey-questionnaire consisted of 32 questions, which addressed a variety of sectors. In addition, interviews and FGDs were held to draw qualitative data that may address gaps in the quantitative findings. Interviews were semi-structured with a core list of open-ended questions to elicit insights that may not have previously been considered by the research team. For example, the questionnaire shed insight on the amount of children not attending school, while interviews offered the chance for families to elaborate on reasons why this was occurring. The sample population for the surveys was selected randomly by enumerators who canvassed neighborhoods in Sinjar. The participants selected for interviews and FGDs were initially recommended by partner organizations and subsequently through snowball sampling. In total, 306 surveys were administered and 23 people were interviewed.

The assessment collected data in 11 communities in Sinjar, and 2 camps in the KRI. The final report presents findings from all these areas to offer a robust picture of needs of the region. During the analysis phase, qualitative data was triangulated with various sources to increase reliability of the findings while quantitative data was analyzed in SPSS software to measure validity. Data collection occurred from January 22 to February 1, 2018 with analysis complete in February 2018.

RIGHT

Children playing in Bakira village waiting for construction of a new school



LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

ACCESS: The target region, Sinjar, currently has severe access restrictions. Due to conflict-related factors over the last three years the region has been isolated by numerous government and militia checkpoints. Access has required specific authorizations beyond country visas issued in Baghdad or Erbil. Although it is possible for humanitarian aid personnel to acquire visas for the region through application, recent events rendered it impossible for a foreign researcher to enter on the timeline necessary for this report.

VIOLENCE: Aside from bureaucratic challenges to access, violence remains an additional factor impacting the reach of the assessment team. Extreme conflict has burdened Iraq for the last three years and some areas of the country remain unsecure. Consequently, the research team had to be aware of these issues and select sites appropriate for their personal safety.

STATISTICAL FIGURES: The figures provided by government or public sources could not be verified with other data due to a dearth of information on the region. As such, the figures should be accepted as a general estimate. Government reports and publicly sourced data is not central to this report, but rather supplementary.

TIMELINE: The timing of the research allowed for a ‘rapid assessment’ of needs. A deeper inquiry could be delved into with more time, but for the purposes of this assessment and the objectives listed by Nadia’s Initiative, a brief but albeit thorough overview is provided.

BELOW

Devastation in Sinjar left much of the region uninhabitable



INFORMATION GAPS AND NEEDS

The Sinjar assessment aimed to provide an overview of the humanitarian situation, priority needs, and vulnerable groups. This process revealed a number of areas that require further in-depth assessment, including:

POPULATION: While the government office in Sinuni provides some statistical figures, a more detailed overview is needed. For example, how many families consider themselves to live in both Sinjar and camps in KRI.

PRE-CRISIS DATA: It was found that most data on the region has been collected post-IS (2014). Therefore, it is difficult to compare and contrast information on Sinjar from before the crisis to after. In the government offices in Sinuni sub-district of Sinjar pre-crisis data is not available due to IS's destruction of infrastructure. This data could potentially be tracked through higher authorities but for purposes of this report that did not occur.

MARKET ASSESSMENTS: This assessment reports on feedback drawn from participants in Sinjar. It elaborates on a need for development assistance and livelihood support. To provide stronger recommendations on future actions a market assessment is essential to understand the commerce sectors most in need of development.

PROTECTION: More protection information and analysis is required and should be collected by gender-balanced assessment teams trained in protection issues and the management of confidential information. Within the protection sector, there should be a focus on the reportedly high levels of psychosocial trauma, as well as vulnerable groups such as women, children, the elderly and disabled. Government reports did not provide robust data on this topic and due to its sensitive nature, the research team was limited in inquiry over the short period of data collection.

Part II

2.1 Livelihood & Food Security

More than 3.5 years after the invasion of the Islamic State, Sinjar continues to struggle with food security and livelihood issues. Farmlands and local markets were devastated in 2014 and the regional economy is yet to rebound. Without re-development assistance, Yazidis face uncertain access to food as well as inconsistent sources of income essential for acquiring basic goods.

Over the course of the crisis, food access has been unpredictable. Until August 2017, Yazidis in Sinjar were reporting a high dependency on food assistance with no predictable line of support from authorities or humanitarian organizations. As a result, the U.N. Food Security Cluster in Iraq stated that many families were turning to negative coping mechanisms; from selling key assets to taking out loans with shopkeepers. In some cases, people were joining armed groups to gain income that could help them meet basic needs¹.

¹ Iraq Food Security Cluster. August 2017. Sinjar Assessment: FSC Partners Report.

At the time of this assessment in early 2018, the majority of the population had begun reporting access to a stable food source; however noted that a permanent solution was still required since current avenues may not be sustainable into the future. The primary food source described was access to Syrian markets across the border. With the uncertainty of geo-political circumstances and immigration restrictions, the solutions Yazidis have found in Syria cannot be considered a long-term strategy towards sustained food security. In addition, the most vulnerable families still lack the financial resources necessary to provide for themselves. Therefore, efforts to ensure the availability and production of affordable food within Sinjar are essential. Although survey data for this report point to positive improvements in food access over the last six months, the situation remains precarious without sustainable measures in place.

Closely tied to food security, income generation and the re-development of livelihoods have also troubled the region. The impact of IS occupation is still felt. Destruction of businesses and farming supplies has destroyed the majority of Yazidi livelihoods, causing income levels to plummet. During the period from 2014-2015 when IS controlled much of the north side of the mountain, farmlands were contaminated with land mines². Farmers were also stripped of equipment and other assets rendering agricultural re-development extremely challenging. The international de-mining organization, MAG³ has made considerable progress towards removing UXOs on the north side (the south side remains heavily mined) opening space for farming and economic growth to occur. Unfortunately, without proper implements, seeds, water, and homes for farmers to return to, agricultural re-development is slow and unable to support the population. According to statistics provided by the U.N.⁴, nearly 70% of household income prior to the invasion of IS stemmed from agricultural activities. The loss of this sector has had an enormous impact.

² FAO United Nations. 2016. Iraq Agricultural and Livelihoods Needs Assessment.

³ Mines Advisory Group

⁴ FAO United Nations. 2016. Iraq Agricultural and Livelihoods Needs Assessment.

” *My parents wanted me to go to school but I joined the militia. They didn't argue because we need the money.*

KHEDER, 17 YEAR OLD BOY

Local businesses have been unable to re-open since most were severely damaged or looted during occupation. In a 2016 market assessment conducted by the humanitarian organization, Yazda, the majority of businesses existing before the crisis remain closed, even those operated by Yazidis who have returned to Sinjar due to lack of material and financial resources. The regional economy is stagnant without replenished goods, crops, and livestock.

The status of livelihood and food security in Sinjar remains in peril. Agricultural lands have been devastated and consistent income generation has been impossible for most Yazidis to achieve. Important concerns must be addressed to maintain a stable Sinjar including: 1. The majority of the population reports unpredictability regarding if food will continue to be available in the future. 2. The absence of food assistance for the poorest families must be addressed to ensure their survival, and 3. An inability for Yazidis to re-establish consistent sources of income limits their ability to meet basic needs.


To manage improvements in this sector, efforts aimed at agricultural redevelopment and income generation are essential. Yazidis need solutions that allow them capacity to once again acquire life-sustaining resources on their own rather than continue reliance on aid networks.



TABLE 2.1

The level of need in each community regarding access to food, essential nutrients, and income.

	Borek	Dehola	Hardan	Sinuni	Khanasor	Degure	Gulhbal	Zorava	Adeka Village	Useva Village	Bakira Village
Access to food	81.1% usually	80.6% usually	32.0% sometimes, 68% usually	20.0% sometimes, 60% usually	42.9% sometimes, 34.3% usually	42.9% sometimes, 54.3% usually	78.6% usually	75.8% usually	68.8% usually	35.7% sometimes, 35.7% usually	33.3% sometimes, 58.3% usually
Access to essential nutrients	78.4% usually	75.0% usually	32.0% sometimes, 56.0% usually	31.4% sometimes, 51.4% usually	45.7% sometimes	45.7% sometimes, 40.0% usually	75.0% usually	39.4% sometimes, 60.6% usually	56.3% sometimes, 37.5% usually	35.7% sometimes, 50.0% usually	41.7% sometimes, 58.3% usually
Proximity to food	91.9%	86.1%	More than 5 km (measured according to mean and median)	88.6%	68.6%	57.1%	71.4%	90.9%	More than 5 km	More than 2 km (measured according to mean and median)	More than 5 km
Public assistance	100%	100%	100%	97.1%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Access to consistent income	64.9% no	86.1% no	83.3% no	48.6% no	37.1% no	65.7% no	89.3% no	84.8% no	68.8% no	57.1% no	91.7% no
Access to sufficient income	43.2% no	55.6% no	37.5% no	37.1% no	45.7% no	62.9% no	67.9% no	63.6% no	37.5% no	50.0% no	16.7% no



As seen in Table 2.1, Yazidis are reporting moderate to good access to food sources but have reached critical levels of income generation. Approximately half of the communities stated their food needs as moderate while the other half stated it was a minor problem. This differs from earlier food security assessments that claim widespread food insecurity for over 50% of the population⁵. The open access to markets in Syria are reported to have improved the situation but do not provide a long-term solution. In addition, many communities are reporting that food is available but not always nutritious.

^{5,6} FAO United Nations. 2016. Iraq Agricultural and Livelihoods Needs Assessment.

Most notable on Table 2.1 is the extreme lack of incomes across almost all geographic areas assessed. The majority of communities ranked severe to critical in their access to sources of income and claim high dependence on support from family outside the region. According to a U.N. report⁶, “Before the crisis, each farm employed around 14 workers on average. In the current situation however, due to a lack of markets, falling prices and increasing costs, many farmers cannot afford to hire the labourers needed to work the same amount of land previously cultivated. Farmers’ income has been reduced by more than 50% since the war against ISIS with poorest among them having to survive on less than \$200 per month. Among the most important factors for this downturn is the lack of payment by government to farmers for crops purchased over the last two years.”

The following displays some of the survey responses for food security and livelihoods.

FIGURE 2.1.1

How far do you travel to purchase food?




FIGURE 2.1.4

Do you make money consistently every month?




FIGURE 2.1.2

Do you have enough food to feed your family?




FIGURE 2.1.5

Do you make enough money to support your family?





FIGURE 2.1.3

Do you have nutritious and healthy food available to you?



In summary, the stable availability of food from Syria is currently sustaining the region, creating an illusion of food security. Central to this issue is the devastation to the agricultural sector, limiting both the production of food supply and economic opportunity for Yazidis.

KEY OBSTACLES TO IMPROVEMENTS

ACCESS ROADS TO KRI CLOSED: Following the liberation of the north side in 2014, most access to Sinjar was through the Feshhbour checkpoint controlled by the KRG. Access from other directions was restricted by IS presence in Mosul, the south side of the mountain, and other pockets of volatility. The checkpoint was the primary route for Yazidis to transport essential goods into Sinjar. Many have claimed the KRG placed disproportionate restrictions on goods causing unnecessary harm to people's access to food, water, livelihoods, and other fundamental rights⁷. Nonetheless, the circumstances allowed for a sizeable migration (approximately 10% of overall population) of Yazidis back to Sinjar from 2014-2017.

⁷ Human Rights Watch. 2016. KRG Restrictions Harm Yazidi Recovery.

Due to the Kurdish Referendum held on September 25, 2017, the Feshabour checkpoint was closed and access to the region is now controlled by the Iraqi central government. The route for Yazidis to reach Sinjar now runs through Mosul. Yazidis have reported similar restrictions on the transport of goods by the central government forces but have noted improvements overtime. However, many Yazidis have expressed continued trauma by having to travel through Mosul, where many were held as slaves, and feel deterred from accessing food and other goods there. Consequently, Yazidis cannot rely on food/support from urban centers in Kurdistan or Mosul. Instead, reliance has shifted to Syria.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS LIMITED: For the last 3.5 years, humanitarian access to Sinjar has been limited. Aid agencies have experienced restrictions by the KRG including limited permission to work in the region and transport materials. The situation grew increasingly problematic as Sinjar was transferred between KRG and Iraqi central government authorities, provoking questions of authority and accountability.

Consistent with protocols of humanitarian response, aid is typically organized through the U.N. cluster system. The U.N. works to understand how aid is being dispersed and to share this information with cluster partners in an effort not to replicate work and neglect areas in need. Cluster coordination is usually located in the capital city; however, Iraq represents a unique scenario where the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan has a capital in Erbil, in addition the Iraq's capital in Baghdad. Consequently, cluster coordination occurs in both cities. Although the U.N. coordination in each of these places collaborates openly, in many ways they

operate as separate entities. This has been problematic in disputed areas where it is unclear who should be coordinating activities. For instance, Sinjar is no longer included in much of the work accomplished by NGOs/aid agencies coordinating with Erbil, and is yet to see full uptake by cluster coordination in Baghdad. Sinjar is at risk of becoming a forgotten region if weak coordinated response continues.

LACK OF REHABILITATION OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR:

As covered by this report, the devastation to Sinjar has been immense. For a region heavily dependent on agriculture for food and livelihoods, the lack of rehabilitation of this sector leaves circumstances grave for Yazidis to migrate home. Although land mines have been removed from farmland, Yazidis are without resources needed for agricultural production and animal husbandry. Water also remains in short supply.

COPING WITH FOOD INSECURITY

Many families are trying to cope by engaging in negative coping mechanisms varying from reducing portion sizes, or the number of meals per day to borrowing money from friends and relatives. A few others were more fortunate and had saved some money for expected hard times.

The interruption of the federal Public Distribution System [PDS] 4 has been reported as one of the main reasons for decreasing food security. There is an urgent need for cash or income amongst the population of the liberated areas, as well as small grants and loans to support livelihood activities... Importantly, supporting the recovery of the agricultural sector will provide citizens with much-needed job opportunities. For the long term recovery of agricultural livelihoods in these governorates, a comprehensive and structured approach to meet immediate, as well as longer term needs is required.

Excerpt from the Iraq Agriculture and Livelihoods Needs Assessment, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2016.



2.2 Shelter & NFIs

During the attacks of 2014, thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed as IS militants attempted to eliminate the existence of Yazidis in Sinjar. Many homes were bombed or burned, while others were made into outposts for militants to reside. Most Yazidis also lost the majority of their possessions after they fled since left belongings were typically disposed of, burned, or lost. The campaign of mass destruction by the Islamic State coincided with their attempt at genocide and ridding the region entirely of Yazidi life and culture.

Although mass destruction has occurred, many structures remain intact and areas to the north are viable for a return of a sizeable portion of the population. However, for all Yazidis to immigrate back, a large amount of homes still need to be reconstructed or repaired. Particularly, the situation for Yazidis from the south side now resettled in the north requires special attention given their struggle to find long-term shelter solutions.

According to UNHABITAT, some 3000 homes are thought to have been destroyed in the liberated collective townships north of Sinjar Mountain⁸. In an assessment conducted just after liberation of the north side, it was found that 70-80% of homes had some extent of damage, of which 30% were due to arson while 40%-50% were due to bombings and explosions⁹. The U.N. Office of Migration confirmed these statistics relatively unchanged in a report produced in early 2017. The report stated that 82% of interviewed returnees reported damaged property. The majority claimed IS occupation was responsible for the damage but mentioned that IDPs and temporary inhabitants had also contributed to the poor conditions of their homes⁹.

⁸ UNHABITAT. 2016. Emerging Land Tenure Issues Among Displaced Yazidis in Iraq.

⁹ EADE. 2015. Field Visit: General Situation in Sinjar.

¹⁰ IOM. 2017. Obstacles to Return in Retaken Areas of Iraq.

” *All of our things were gone when we went to our old house. We didn't have a stove to cook or beds to sleep on. Daesh destroyed everything... even if your house is still standing, there's nothing there. So I came back to the camp but my family took another home in Sinjar.*

KHALIL, 27 YEARS OLD

Statistics regarding the status of the south side have yet to be determined due to land mine hazards and a more severe level of destruction. Further analysis of the south side will need to occur but assessments of the north display 1. A need for varying amounts of reconstruction assistance across the region, and 2. A solution for IDPs relocated from the south to the north side of Sinjar Mountain.

The areas north of the mountain have endured a significant amount of damage but the region has a strong foundation for re-development. Findings for this report show that approximately half of all communities are damaged meaning existing structures could support a return of around 50% of the Yazidi population without any reconstruction assistance. However, for all Yazidis to move from camps back to their homeland, efforts to rebuild the remaining 50% of houses will need to occur. Issues involving access to rebuilding materials and re-establishment of hygienic sanitation facilities must also be addressed.

TABLE 2.2

Severity of shelter needs for people in north Sinjar regarding levels of destruction, the amount of reconstruction occurring to date, access to rebuilding materials, types of housing available to returnees, and sanitation facilities.

	Borek	Dehola	Hardan	Sinuni	Khanasor	Degure	Gulhbal	Zorava	Adeka Village	Useva Village	Bakira Village
Destruction of homes	48,6% half, 43,2% just under half	half (measured according to median)	half (measured according to median)	71,4% just under half	more than half (measured according to median)	71,4% more than half	35,7% just under half, 60,7% under 10%	42,4% just under half, 48,5% under 10%	just under half (measured according to median)	50% under 10%, 50% no damage	41,7% under 10%, 50% no damage
Amount of rebuilding	100% none	100% none	100% none	100% none	100% none	100% none	100% none	100% none	100% none	92,9% none	100% most
Access to sanitation facilities	43,2% no	50% no	36% no	20% no	37,1% no	34,3% no	60,7% no	48,5% no	56,3% no	57,1% no	36,4% no
Housing condition	45,3%	55,6%	62,5%	42,8%	62,9%	68,6%	57,2%	60,6%	68,8%	78,6%	58,3%
Access to rebuilding materials	40,5% sometimes, 29,7% usually	usually (measured according to median and majority)	36% sometimes, 36% usually	28,6% sometimes, 60% usually	28,6% sometimes, 54,3% usually	74,3% usually	usually (measured according to median and majority)	27,3% sometimes, 48,5% usually	usually (measured according to median and majority)	64,3% usually	33,3% sometimes, 41,7% usually




Table 2.2 displays the severity of shelter needs for people in north Sinjar regarding levels of destruction, the amount of reconstruction occurring to date, access to rebuilding materials, types of housing available to returnees, and sanitation facilities.

As noted in the table, communities have experienced a varying amount of destruction. Although overall trends across the north display that approximately 50% of homes were impacted, some communities were harder hit than others. For example, the villages at the base of the mountain (Adeka, Useva, & Bakira) expressed only minor destruction of homes while larger communities like Khanasor and Degure expressed severe destruction, and Borek, Dehola, and Hardan cite the situation as a major problem. The data point to a concentration of damage in the collectives with less impact to rural areas. Since much of the warfare for retaking the northern side of Sinjar occurred within the collectives, it is logical that these areas have expressed the highest levels of destruction.

The findings also display almost no rebuilding has occurred of damaged homes. Across all the collectives and one of the villages, people claim zero work has been accomplished to reconstruct their

communities. In only two of the villages, reports of progress have been made. During focus groups and interviews, Yazidis stated that it was easier to rebuild the rural areas since most homes there were made of mud, clay, stone, and other materials found in the region. Homes in the collectives required additional materials such as cement, wood, and steel that are not always readily available.

UNHABITAT has begun a home building program in north Sinjar. Over the last year a few hundred small homes have been built. However, survey participants claim that these are new constructions and no project exists to help rehabilitate existing structures, including the large amount of damaged homes where most people currently reside.

BELOW

Some of the survey responses for shelter and NFI issues.

FIGURE 2.2.1

How many homes have been rebuilt since 2014?




FIGURE 2.2.2

Does your home have adequate sanitation facilities?




FIGURE 2.2.3

Please describe your current home.





FIGURE 2.2.4

How much of this community was damaged by ISIS?



Most Yazidis are now living in shelters/homes that require some level of reconstruction assistance. In total, only 42% of people are living in structures that are fully constructed and undamaged by IS occupation. The other 58% of people reside in tents, damaged homes, or homes that were in the process

of building when IS invaded. Some Yazidis reported living in tents even three years after the crisis began.

In summary, the existing shelters in Sinjar can support a sizeable migration of Yazidis from camps to home (approximately 50%). However, the full population will not be able to return until attention is given to the half of the community that remains in a damaged state.

KEY OBSTACLES TO IMPROVEMENTS

LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF REBUILDING MATERIALS: Prior to the invasion of IS, Sinjar contained multiple factories where rebuilding materials such as cement were available. The destruction of these factories in 2014 has left the region in need of outside resources for rebuilding. These resources exist in the KRI or other areas of Iraq but permission to transport materials into Sinjar has been difficult for Yazidis to attain. Since the change in authority from the KRG to the Iraqi central government, the restrictions are reported to have loosened but the situation is still not without challenges. Therefore, the region currently lacks factories to produce rebuilding materials and government policies have blocked much progress from occurring.

HEIGHTENED POVERTY AND LIMITATION OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES: Yazidis continue to struggle with re-establishing livelihoods and consequently do not have the financial resources necessary to purchase rebuilding materials. Half of all returnees in Sinjar claim a reliance on support from extended family members in other regions of the country or living internationally. An assessment conducted in August 2017 displays that 51% of Yazidis in Sinjar had borrowed cash or purchased credit in the three months prior to the survey. If rebuilding materials were readily available in Sinjar, a majority of families would still not be able to afford to purchase them.

LAND TENURE ISSUES: Issues of land rights have plagued the Sinjar region for decades. The crisis of 2014 has not only spotlighted these issues but worsened them in many ways. Since Saddam Hussein instituted processes of Arabization in the 1970s, Yazidis have lost portions of their historic homeland as Muslim populations have grown. For years they have been displaced and relocated to areas such as the collective townships that run parallel with the northern side of the mountain. UNHABITAT produced

a report addressing this issue in 2015. The intent was to present aims to provide a better understanding of how the convergence of several circumstances, related to past discriminatory policies, forced relocation, double displacement (including displacement by the 2014 crisis) and lack of tenure security may seriously affect the prospects of return of the Yazidi IDP community to their homeland in Sinjar¹¹. The report concluded a need to develop interventions that address land tenure so that Yazidis may return and maintain lands historically their own. The U.N. has emphasized that persons forcibly transferred from their homes in violation of international standards are entitled to return to their home areas and property, a right known as the “right to return”. Government agencies and the international community should assist in upholding this right.

¹¹ UNHABITAT. 2016. Emerging Land Tenure Issues Among Displaced Yazidis in Iraq.

YAZIDI IDPs FROM THE SOUTH NOW RESIDING IN THE NORTH: The south side of Sinjar Mountain remains uninhabitable as of the time of this report (with Sinjar city as an exception). Consequently, some Yazidis from the south side have found refuge on the north side of the mountain. These Yazidis have taken up residence in homes belonging to Yazidis now residing in camps in the KRI. They have become “squatters” without a permanent plan to relocate. It is unclear if these Yazidis will return to the south side since there are presently no comprehensive plans for de-mining and redevelopment of the southern region. This issue compounds the more general questions of land tenure in Sinjar.

BELOW

Children find a toy in Sinjar. Families typically lost all belongings in the crisis





2.3 Education

Conflict has taken a heavy toll on education in Sinjar. Many children remain out of school, teachers are in short supply, and buildings still show signs of conflict. Rehabilitating the educational network has been challenging but continues to be important for healing children and promoting future stability. Years of displacement and violence have negatively impacted Yazidi youth and attention to strengthening education is essential to improving their welfare.

The time is critical for children to be able to access education and benefit and from the routine and sense of normalcy that schools can provide. Education is not only an avenue towards a positive future, it offers a safe space for children to access psychosocial services and reconnect with social networks. Providing schooling during and in the aftermath of crisis is valuable to a child's wellbeing. Particularly for Yazidi youth who have seen horrific violence, been abducted and separated from family members, it is one avenue for them to obtain care. To re-establish education in Sinjar, attention to 1. Infrastructure, 2. Teachers, and 3. Factors that increase the rate of out-of-school children must be addressed.

Prior to the 2014 crisis, the educational network in Sinjar was stable. Those interviewed for this report claimed schools were widely available, teachers were regularly paid, and parents were generally supportive of sending their children to receive an education. Although enrollment statistics for Sinjar were not as strong as in other regions of the country, the school system was well established.

” I didn’t get to go to school for a long time. My old school was damaged so they closed it. My family thought about moving to a camp so I could go to school there but finally one opened near me. Now I go everyday. I like to see my friends and to study.

SAMER, 14 YEAR OLD BOY

When IS invaded they bombed and burned school buildings. Some schools were also taken and occupied by IS militants as outposts. These buildings were severely damaged through intense warfare when northern Sinjar was retaken by Iraqi coalition forces. As such, many schools were demolished while others still stand with visual reminders of the violence that occurred. The aftermath of conflict has seen the education system struggle to rebuild.




TABLE 2.3

Severity of needs in Sinjar, including information on access to schools, amounts of teachers and resources available, school safety, and attendance.

	Borek	Dehola	Hardan	Sinuni	Khanasor	Degure	Gulhbal	Zorava	Adeka Village	Useva Village	Bakira Village
Access to schools	43,2% no	36,1% no	100% no	11,4% no	97,1% no	100% no	71,4% no	72,7% no	56,3% no	92,9% no	100% no
Sufficient number of teachers	97,3% never	100% never	100% N/A	100% never	68,6% never	100% never	100% never	60,6% never	100% never	100% N/A	100% N/A
Sufficient school supplies	100% no	100% no	100% no	100% no	100% no	100% no	100% no	100% no	100% no	100% no	100% no
School safety	35,1% sometimes, 37,8% usually	52,8% never	48,0% sometimes, 52,0% usually	60% usually	57,1% usually	71,4% usually	42,9% sometimes, 35,7% usually	54,5% always	50,0% always	100% N/A	33,3% sometimes, 33,3% usually
School attendance	24,3% no	50% no	36% no	37,1% no	42,9% no	37,1% no	46,4% no	33,3% no	43,8% no	57,1% no	50% no

RIGHT

A girl studies in Sinjar, where many children are without books and supplies



The devastation of the educational sector in Sinjar will have a generational effect. If schools and quality learning are not made available to all children, the future of the region is bleak. Global data has shown that education is a key factor in establishing stable and peaceful societies. It is a driver of progress for social development, economic growth, and human rights. Education is not only an immediate solution for improving the welfare of children impacted by conflict but also a long-term effort at sustainable peace and development.

The severity index displays a grave situation for education in Sinjar. The majority of communities rank critical or severe across multiple categories. Low school attendance rates are likely linked to the other factors measured including poor access to schools, insufficient teaching staff and resources, and lingering feelings of insecurity.

Over the last 3.5 years, multiple schools have been re-established. Typically schools that were damaged were not repaired but rather caravan schools have been built to take their place. Most of these caravans came with the help of UNICEF and resemble schools built

” *My backpack makes me feel so happy. I got it from a NGO. It makes me excited to go to school each day. It makes me feel like a kid again.*

ADIBA, 9 YEAR OLD

in camps. Several schools in Sinjar also withstood the conflict with minimal damage. Although basic infrastructure for education is growing, more structures need to be built. According to data for this report, 67% of those surveyed stated that a school was not available within a safe walking distance of their homes.

Beyond infrastructure, the availability of quality teachers has been cited as a primary concern. Prior to the 2014 crisis, the sizeable portion of schools maintained the Arabic curriculum and were administered by the Iraqi central government (other schools used the Kurdish curriculum administered by the KRG). The Arabic schools employed a high number of Muslim teachers, even in schools typically composed of Yazidis. These teachers have been hesitant to return to Sinjar until reconciliation can occur. Consequently, much of the previous teaching force no longer resides in Sinjar. Many of the Yazidi teachers have also stayed in camps in KRI since redevelopment of the region has been slow.

Teacher salaries are another major inhibitor of progress in this sector. Teachers do not regularly receive payment and often must find other paid work. According to focus group participants, most teachers in Sinjar are volunteers. They have not been trained in teaching pedagogy or the subject matter that they teach. They volunteer their time so that schools can remain open; however, turnover is high since many must leave to pursue paid employment elsewhere. Some trained teachers have returned to Sinjar and are paid a salary from the Iraqi central government, but they are few in numbers. In most focus groups and interviews, participants claimed that the absence of teacher salaries was the greatest problem schools faced.

The availability of school resources ranked critical across all communities. Those surveyed stated that teachers often had to buy textbooks for children to use. Supplies such as paper and pencils were also not available.

In summary, rehabilitating the education sector continues to have challenges despite growing attention to infrastructure. Although schools have begun to be reconstructed many issues still exist. Particularly the dearth of qualified teachers in the region and absence of salaries are the highest cited problems. School security and lack of teaching/learning supplies also require attention.

FIGURE 2.3.1

Are schools available within safe walking distance (30 min. walk)?




FIGURE 2.3.2

Are there enough teachers to teach the children?





FIGURE 2.3.3

Are the majority of school-aged children attending school?



KEY OBSTACLES TO IMPROVEMENTS

INFRASTRUCTURE: Prior to the conflict, 58 schools existed on the north side of the mountain. Since liberation of the area, 27 have reopened. With only 10-15% of the population returned, this would seem sufficient. However, the majority of people surveyed stated that no school was available within a safe walking distance (30 minutes). Therefore, further assessment of population concentrations and the location of schools is necessary. Additionally, some schools are still damage from the conflict. Parents of students claimed that although the damaged schools are still functional, it is a daily reminder of the violence many endured.

TEACHER SALARIES & TRAINING: With most of the teaching force displaced to Kurdistan, the pool of qualified teachers in Sinjar is weak. Volunteer teachers are taking their place but require trainings and certifications to ensure quality learning. Additionally, the turnover of volunteer teachers remains high without guarantees of salaries.

FACTORS INCREASING RATES OF OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN: The rate of out of school children in Sinjar remains high. According to government statistics, 38% of children in Sinjar are attending school while 62% are out of school. This statistic varies from survey data that asked Yazidi participants to estimate rates of attendance. Survey data displayed an inverse statistic of 60% in school and 40% out of school. Explanations for the variation may include that schools only officially record children who attend regularly, while parents counted children who sometimes attend. Both sources of data display a high rate of out of school children. To improve the education sector in Sinjar the reasons children are not attending school must be addressed. In focus groups and interviews the following factors were discussed:

CHILDREN JOINING MILITIAS: Since 2014 children have been joining militias in Sinjar. Some have joined KRG Peshmurga to gain income for their families. Others have joined the PKK, which helped to liberate many Yazidis stranded on the mountain during the attacks by IS. Human Rights Watch has been formally documenting the illegal recruitment of children in Sinjar¹² and the problem persists. These children do not attend school and contribute to high out of school rates.

¹² Neff, Z. 2017. Stop recruiting child soldiers in Iraq. Human Rights Watch.

POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON EDUCATION: Sinjar has long been disputed territory. Although it was formally recognized under the Iraqi central government, the KRG has sometimes maintained defacto control. Consequently, schools in the region have been a mix of Arabic and Kurdish curricula administered by separate ministries of education. Prior to 2014, Yazidis had a choice of curricula with most preferring Arabic according to interview participants. However, following liberation of the north side the KRG took over regional authority and primarily built Kurdish schools. In 2017 authority was returned to the Iraqi central government leading to a shift to Arabic curriculum. Greater investigation is needed regarding this topic but according to research for this survey the shifting of curricula has been challenging for some students. In some interviews, parents stated that their children struggled to switch and keep up with other students leading them to quit school. In addition, the PKK has helped to establish schools but are not officially sanctioned. Students attending these schools currently cannot access proper credentials to go onto higher education.

BOREDOM AND DISTURBANCE OF SOCIAL NETWORK: During focus groups and interviews, participants claimed students did not always want to attend because the situation has changed drastically since they were in school before. Their normal social networks have been disrupted and many children are living in different homes and attending new schools. This has been challenging for some students who no longer feel encouraged to attend. Additionally, boredom was cited as an obstacle to attendance. Schools lack proper supplies and qualified teachers. Consequently, children feel bored as school and prefer to be home.

CHILDREN HAVE AGED OUT: In many cases, parents expressed that their children had aged out of education and could not rejoin schools. In Iraq, children can only be out of school for two years before they aged out of the possibility to rejoin. For children who were taken in captivity or spent years moving with their families to various camps/cities this restriction is damning.



2.4 Health

The status of health in Iraq has been precarious for decades and conflicts have only worsened the situation. According to the World Health Organization, the regime that ruled Iraq prior to the removal of Saddam Hussein, did not consider health a priority; the health system, therefore, suffered from progressive neglect and budgetary allocations did not reflect population needs. As a result, health indicators fell to levels comparable to some of the least developed countries¹³. In the last few years as conflicts have raged, health has continued to suffer. The current status of national security, the deterioration of infrastructure, difficulty in accessing clean water, and national levels of poverty, malnutrition, and social fragility are all factors that continue to negatively impact the health of people in Iraq¹⁴. The situation has been distressing for years and ongoing violence has further inhibited solutions.

The status of Sinjar is particularly troubling. After the invasion of the Islamic State, health facilities were damaged or destroyed and medical staff fled to other regions. In the aftermath, buildings have been re-constructed but key staff and resources remain absent. According to government records¹⁵ prior to the conflict, a total of 1 hospital and 8 clinics were available (on the north side).

¹³ Iraq Ministry of Health. 2004. The Current Situation, Our Vision for the Future and Areas of Work

¹⁴ Al Hilfi, T. K. Y. [2014]. Toward a healthier Iraq. The Yale journal of biology and medicine, 87(3), 289.

¹⁵ Sinuni Sub-District Government Office. 2018.

Since liberation, the hospital and 6 of the clinics have re-opened. However, although facilities are once again serving the public, medicines, specialized care, and emergency services are in short supply. The reconstruction of buildings has been an important first step, but quality healthcare requires more comprehensive solutions.

Research for this report has produced a picture of the needs existing in Sinjar. However, statistics regarding mortality rates, infectious diseases, reproductive health, and other important indicators specific to the region are absent. Such statistics were not readily available, possibly displaying the level of neglect the region has experienced over the years.

Improving healthcare is a pre-requisite for sustainable development and an essential component of reconstruction. Health is a cross-cutting theme across all sectors of aid and impacts such issues as school attendance and employment rates. Although basic facilities exist in Sinjar, the population of returnees cites major problems. In particular, greater attention must be paid to ensuring availability of medicines, affordable transportation to medical facilities, specialized care, and after-hours assistance.




TABLE 2.4

The level of need in each community regarding medical supplies, access to health facilities, efficiency and affordability of services, and the range of healthcare facilities available.

	Borek	Dehola	Hardan	Sinuni	Khanasor	Degure	Gulhbal	Zorava	Adeka Village	Useva Village	Bakira Village
Access to medical supplies	59,9% no	33,3% no	76,0% no	37,1% no	14,3% no	48,6% no	46,4% no	60,6% no	43,8% no	35,7% no	50% no
Access to local health-care	0,0% no	0,0% no	100,0% no	2,9% no	0,0% no	2,9% no	0,0% no	0,0% no	6,3% no	100,0% no	100,0% no
Efficiency of healthcare services	5 times	6-8 times	6-8 times	5 times	6-8 times	6-8 times	5 times	5 times	100% no	100% no	100% no
Healthcare affordability	37,8% no	38,9% no	72,0% no	40,0% no	60,0% no	68,6% no	39,3% no	45,5% no	37,5% no	35,7% no	58,3% no
Range of healthcare facilities	Mobile unit & clinic	Only clinic	No access	Hospital without emergency care	Only clinic	Only clinic	Only clinic	Mobile unit & clinic	Only mobile unit	Only mobile unit	Only mobile unit

* *Note: Efficiency of healthcare services is measured according to median instead of percentage due to the widespread of the data*

As the table displays, access issues are commonly reported as minimal with the exception of the smallest communities where facilities are unavailable. Residents of Useva, Bakira, and Hardan must travel to larger towns to access services. Residents of other, more populous communities reported that a facility was usually available.

” *If we have an emergency we have to cross into Syria to go to the hospital there. Imagine having complications in child birth and having to wait at the security checkpoint.*

VERA, 27 YEAR OLD MOTHER

More severe issues cited by survey participants include the efficiency and affordability of health services and a dearth of medicine/supplies. Regarding efficiency, survey participants were asked how many times they needed healthcare in the last year and if it was available to them. Across all communities this topic was cited as a major to severe problem. On average, participants claimed that on more than five occasions they were unable to access the services they needed. In interviews, it was elaborated that often specialty care (such as reproductive health or pediatrics) was needed but unavailable.

The affordability of healthcare also ranked as a moderate to severe problem. Although fees in Sinjar are relatively the same as in other regions of the country, participants claimed that they had to travel far to reach a medical facility. Therefore, factoring in transportation costs, the affordability of healthcare was cited as problematic.

Lastly, the availability of medicine/ medical supplies ranked severe to critical in the communities surveyed. Participants claimed that although they could see a doctor, they often left without the medicines they needed. The dearth of resources in this area is possibly linked to the heavy restrictions placed on goods at checkpoints. Participants noted that sometimes they could not even access over the counter analgesics like Paracetamol.

The lack of sufficient healthcare is driving Yazidis to seek services in major cities outside Sinjar such as Duhok, Zakho, or across the border in Syria. Of course access to these services is only available to families that can afford the transportation and as a result, the most vulnerable families continue to suffer. Having to travel long distances for sufficient healthcare is especially problematic during emergencies.

BELOW

Some of the survey responses regarding health

FIGURE 2.4.1

Do you have access to necessary medicine/ medical supplies?




FIGURE 2.4.2

Is there a health clinic within the community?




FIGURE 2.4.3

How many times has your family needed health care and not received it this past year?





FIGURE 2.4.4

What kind of health care facilities are available to you?



KEY OBSTACLES TO IMPROVEMENTS

RESTRICTED SUPPLY OF MEDICINE: The restrictive policies of government officials limit the movement of essential medicines and supplies to the Sinjar region. Officials have claimed that goods are restricted in order to prohibit terrorist groups from gaining access to supplies; however, an entire population of civilians now suffers.

SPECIALIZED CARE UNAVAILABLE: Specialized services such as pediatrics, neurology, oncology, etc. continue to be unavailable in Sinjar. Consequently, most patients can only access general care to address such things as flu, minor respiratory sicknesses, and common aches and pains. Comprehensive care is not available in the region.

WOMEN'S HEALTH SERVICES UNAVAILABLE: Along with specialized care, women's health services are not commonly available. These services are listed as separate in this report because although women's health is a specialty, it must be emphasized due to women encompassing half the population. When women do not have access to reproductive health services, this constitutes a major problem for a vast portion of the population.

ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLY ISSUES: Although health facilities have been re-established, many lack important infrastructure and consistency in such resources as water and electricity. Utilities have historically been difficult to come by in Sinjar but nonetheless are essential in life-saving facilities like hospitals and clinics. During focus groups and interviews, some healthcare workers stated that it was possible for patients to come to the hospital and have to be served in the dark.

TRANSPORTATION TO MEDICAL FACILITIES: The amount of healthcare facilities that have been re-established is impressive but still out of reach for many. According to survey data, 18% of respondents do not have access to healthcare in their communities. This number is likely much higher if more villages were assessed but for purposes of this report, data collection was concentrated in the more populated centers.



2.5 Infrastructure


The status of infrastructure in Sinjar is in need of comprehensive solutions. The region struggled with poor roads, weak utilities, and crumbling buildings even before the Islamic State arrived. In the aftermath of conflict, Sinjar's deficient public facilities have further deteriorated. To encourage a migration of Yazidis from camps back to their homeland, it is essential to rebuild and restore important public services.

For purposes of this report, infrastructure refers specifically to electricity and water supplies. Although infrastructural elements typically include a wider array of physical facilities such as roads, sanitation plants, etc. the scope of this research is limited to the most basic features. In preliminary interviews conducted in advance of fieldwork, electricity and water were cited as the most important areas of concern and consequently, drove data collection regarding re-development of the sector. In future research, other issues such as roads, trash disposal etc. should be addressed.

¹⁶ UNDP, 2017.
UNDP continues to expand stabilization support for Iraqi Government to help families return home, including minority communities.

To reignite development in Sinjar, attention to electricity and water issues must be an initial action. In some ways programming aimed at these functions has already begun but the effect has been minimal. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has established the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS) and Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilization (FFES) in Iraq. These stabilization programs focus on restoring vital services in areas liberated from IS, including Sinjar. As of fall 2017, UNDP had begun projects in 55 Yazidi communities including repairing wells, schools, hospitals, and a comprehensive electricity project. Plans for an overhaul of Sinjar’s water network are also underway¹⁶.

The work of UNDP will bring vital services back to Sinjar if plans are carried out in full. However, the electricity project is only partially complete as of the time of this report and it remains unclear if the final phases of the project will occur. Currently electricity has reached the northeastern portion of the Ninewa plain including areas such as Ra’bia but is yet to fully reach Yazidi towns in Sinjar. During interviews and focus groups, Yazidis stated they had not noticed a change in the power supply since liberation. In addition, plans for a comprehensive water project have been stated, but actual implementation is yet to begin.



The situation in Sinjar is challenging without basic infrastructure to assist in resettlement. Services like electricity and water are key but an array of needs still exists. Although UNDP has begun programming for re-development, further attention needs to be paid to this sector. Over the last few years plans have been stalled or failed to come to fruition. Therefore, more concrete commitments are essential.

TABLE 2.5

Level of need in each community regarding infrastructural issues

	Borek	Dehola	Hardan	Sinuni	Khanasor	Degure	Gulhbal	Zorava	Adeka Village	Useva Village	Bakira Village
Access to public infrastructure	94,6% usually	91,7% usually	44,0% sometimes, 56,0% usually	97,1% usually	74,3% usually	77,1% usually	85,7% usually	90,0% usually	75,0% usually	35,7% sometimes, 57,1% usually	91,7% usually
Frequency of power outages	10 hrs/day or more	10 hrs/day or more	<15%	Less than 10 hrs/day	Electricity is available some days but not all	Electricity is available some days but not all	Electricity is available some days but not all	Electricity is available some days but not all	Less than 10 hrs/day	Electricity is available some days but not all	Less than 10 hrs/day
Access to fuel	58,8% rarely	50% never	60,0% rarely	48,6% never, 51,4% rarely	65,7% rarely	71,4% never	57,1% never	30,3% never, 33,3% rarely, 30,3% usually	50,0% rarely	78,6% never	25,0% never, 33,3% rarely, 41,7% sometimes
Access to sufficient water	35,1% no	60,0% no	60,0% no	28,6% no	22,9% no	54,3% no	44,4% no	45,5% no	37,5% no	35,7% no	58,3% no

As seen in Table 2.5, most Yazidis in Sinjar reported access to electricity and water but insufficient supplies. For example, across all communities assessed, people claimed that public services were indeed available but that water was not sufficient to meet their needs and electricity was only possible at certain times.

Water ranked as a moderate to severe problem in most communities. This is problematic for families to meet standards of health and sanitation but also restricts agricultural re-development. Most families in Sinjar rely on ‘water trucking’ to receive essential supplies. This is a process of purchasing from private vendors who transport tanks of water to each community. This practice has become increasingly common over the years as droughts have plagued the region. Prior to the attacks by IS it was easier for families to incur the costs; however in the aftermath, poverty has stricken many who now struggle for this basic feature of life.

Access to electricity was also cited as problematic. In a survey question, families were asked how many hours of electricity they receive each day. Only 23% had access to 10 or more hours daily. Twenty-five percent had access to less than 10 hours daily and 52% stated that electricity was not available each day. Poor access to electricity has been a primary factor in Yazidi families preferring to stay in camps where they have regular services rather than to return home.

The supply of fuel in the region is also low. Families require fuel to power generators when electricity is unavailable and also use it for cars, tractors, etc. The availability of fuel has been cited as a critical problem in multiple communities. In focus groups and interviews, participants stated that fuel is often restricted at the checkpoints.

BELOW
Some of the survey responses for infrastructure

FIGURE 2.5.1

How many hours per day is there electricity?




FIGURE 2.5.2

Is fuel available (for heat in winter, stoves)?




FIGURE 2.5.3

Do you have access to water and electricity?





FIGURE 2.5.4

Do you have access to enough water?



In summary, the lack of access to water, electricity, and fuel heavily restricts resettlement. Current resources barely support the existing population of returnees. A mass migration of all Yazidis back to Sinjar will be difficult until these issues are resolved.

KEY OBSTACLES TO IMPROVEMENTS

DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION FOR ELECTRICITY:

The supply of electricity in Sinjar is both insufficient and erratic. Prior to the crisis, most Yazidis relied on generators for power due to inconsistency with the national grid. Unfortunately, generators require fuel that poor families often cannot afford. In addition, fuel easily becomes restricted when political circumstances change in the region. Therefore, a sustainable solution is required. Yazidis require an energy source that is regular, and produced locally if possible.

DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION FOR WATER:

Water issues in Sinjar have grown increasingly worse over the years. Yazidis have become more reliant on water trucking; however this solution fails to assist the most poor/vulnerable families. A comprehensive and sustainable solution is essential to health and agricultural re-development.



2.6 Protection

Upholding standards of protection are at the core of humanitarian aid and international development assistance. During periods of conflict and recovery, civilians are at risk of violence, abuse, and deprivation. To ensure rights are preserved, especially among the most vulnerable populations, governments, agencies, and local partners must work together to monitor and address threats.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has created principles to support this endeavor, which are implemented through the Global Protection Cluster. The principles affirm that all humanitarian actors have a responsibility to place protection at the center of their activities. These principles transcend humanitarian aid to apply to re-development assistance when communities continue in crisis. Particularly, protection themes focus on child protection, gender-based violence (GBV), land/housing/property, and mine action.

The situation in Sinjar is extremely challenging regarding protection issues. As addressed in previous sections, land tenure is a historic problem reaching back decades. Mines (UXOs) are also ubiquitous in the region, especially on the south side of Sinjar Mountain. These two issues are currently being addressed by UNHABITAT and de-mining organizations like MAG (in limited capacity); however the situation for child protection and GBV has not received the same dedicated attention.

” *They took us to a camp for training. We learned how to use guns but also about the political ideology of our leaders. There were two groups, one for older kids and one for kids under 12.*

SAIDO, 17 YEAR OLD BOY

Children in Sinjar remain under serious risk of recruitment into militias. As of early 2017, 29 cases of child recruitment had been recorded by a prominent human rights organization¹⁷. In interviews for this research, children claimed the numbers were much higher based on the training group size some former child soldiers described. Their estimates ranged from a few hundred to a few thousand. In addition, many children are at risk of malnutrition. Government records¹⁸ show that 43% of children who visited local medical clinics in 2017 were malnourished.

The situation of GBV in Sinjar is also challenging since it is largely un-monitored. Participants in focus groups and interviews stated that there is currently no strong mechanism for reporting and addressing these types of abuses. Some NGOs are currently working on GBV issues in the area, but focus work on female survivors of IS enslavement (presently there are 64 survivors registered in Sinjar) and offer little assistance for ongoing GVB issues. In an earlier needs assessment, it was noted that access to protection services is effectively non-existent in the area without travel to Sinuni or outside of Sinjar.

It must be noted that an accurate portrayal of protection issues in Sinjar is a difficult task for the scope of this report. The sensitive nature of protection issues limited the research team from deep exploration of the topic. Therefore, only a brief sampling of statistics is provided here with strong recommendations that further research occur.

¹⁷ Neff, Z. 2017.
Stop Recruiting Child Soldiers in Iraq.
Human Rights Watch

¹⁸ Sinuni Sub-District Office.
2018.

TABLE 2.6

Level of need in each community regarding heads of households and persons with disabilities

	Borek	Dehola	Hardan	Sinuni	Khanasor	Degure	Gulhbal	Zorava	Adeka Village	Useva Village	Bakira Village
Female headed	41,7% yes	25,7% yes	50,0% yes	48,6% yes	45,7% yes	48,5% yes	67,9% yes	63,6% yes	25,0% yes	42,9% yes	41,7% yes
Child headed	5,4% yes	0,0% yes	0,0% yes	0,0% yes	8,6% yes	2,9% yes	0,0% yes	0,0% yes	0,0% yes	0,0% yes	0,0% yes
Single headed	64,9% yes	63,9% yes	79,2% yes	48,6% yes	51,4% yes	60,0% yes	64,3% yes	72,7% yes	75,0% yes	50,0% yes	91,7% yes
Elderly headed	75,7% yes	72,2% yes	29,2% yes	85,7% yes	60,0% yes	82,9% yes	53,6% yes	39,4% yes	43,8% yes	71,4% yes	41,7% yes
Access to care for disabilities	24,3% yes	25,0% yes	41,7% yes	37,1% yes	42,9% yes	45,7% yes	21,4% yes	36,4% yes	50,0% yes	35,7% yes	33,3% yes

FIGURE 2.6.1

Is this a female-headed household?




FIGURE 2.6.2

Is this household headed by someone older than 60 years old?





FIGURE 2.6.3

Is there only one parent in this household?





FIGURE 2.6.4

Is there anyone in this family who has a disability and does not receive professional care for it?



LEFT
Survey responses for food security and livelihood

Part III

3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

Sinjar continues to need comprehensive assistance to rebuild. More than 3.5 years after the crisis began, the Yazidi population remains unable to return to their homeland. Hundreds of thousands of people live semi-permanently in IDP camps and bear the weight of uncertain futures. To return and rebuild their lives in Sinjar, development aid across multiple sectors is required.

Over the last few years, various NGOs and agencies have begun projects in the region but most have created limited impact. This has partially been due to diverted attention to the Mosul operation and other regional crises. Aid networks have struggled to maintain commitments to Sinjar with other conflicts drawing on their resources. Additionally, most of the support provided has come in the form of humanitarian aid/rapid relief rather than long-term development assistance. Temporary projects have been created for shelters, health facilities, etc., but more sustainable solutions are needed for wide scale resettlement.

UNDP, UNHABITAT, and a few other agencies have begun the process of planning for long-term development; however, implementation has been slow and the future of these projects is unpredictable. In particular, UNDP has been working to bring electricity to both the north and south side of Sinjar but power is yet to reach Yazidi villages and work has been stalled on the sub-district's edge. UNHABITAT has also constructed several hundred small houses but a rebuilding fund for the thousands of homes damaged by IS is unavailable. The need for re-development assistance in Sinjar has been on the agenda of major aid agencies; however, commitments have been fluid and the region continues to be neglected.

To resettle the Yazidi population in Sinjar, concrete commitments to support long-term development are essential. Some groundwork has been laid but further action is required. The potential for Yazidis to return home is high if appropriate rebuilding assistance can be provided.

The aim of this report is to display the status of Sinjar regarding needs and possible solutions for re-development. The previous section offered a description of needs across six different sectors of development, including a severity index to show the level of needs. Subsequently, this section is intended to put forth potential solutions to address the problems previously discussed. It must be noted that deeper research into each individual sector is required for an effective response. The scope of this report provides an overview to serve as a starting point into developing comprehensive responses.

The following provides some key recommendations to continue the process of rebuilding in Sinjar.



LEFT

A man helps to break apart rock and cement to rebuild a school

Livelihood & Food Security

AGRICULTURAL REDEVELOPMENT

including irrigation systems, farm equipment, etc.

¹ FAO United Nations. 2016.
Iraq Agricultural and Livelihoods
Needs Assessment.

Sinjar is a region heavily reliant on agriculture for livelihood support and food security. To restore this important economic sector and the food access it provides, a variety of resources are needed. To begin, families require replenished livestock. According to a survey conducted by the U.N. Food Security Cluster¹, the majority of families in Sinjar kept on average 20 sheep (and upwards of 100 in a flock). After the invasion of IS, almost all livestock were killed or disappeared. The depletion of livestock has been detrimental to families that sell animal products like milk, cheese, etc. Women were especially active in this area of livelihood support and a replenished supply would benefit them greatly.

The loss of tractors and equipment has also devastated the region. Families surveyed claimed that a lack of income and capacity to purchase necessary inputs to plant new crops was problematic. Irrigation systems have also been damaged and the region faces an ongoing water crisis. For Yazidis to re-establish their lives, they need support for farming implements, seeds, fertilizer, livestock, and access to consistent water resources.

ESTABLISHING MORE MARKETS

especially in villages

To access food, many Yazidis have to travel long distances. According to findings in this report, 35% of Yazidis in Sinjar have to go more than 2 kilometers with 10% having to go more than 5 kilometers. It must be noted that data collection for this report was concentrated in collectives/population hubs. As was the case, the access to markets reported was likely much higher than if data collection occurred only in villages. Therefore, although access to markets displays as only a moderate need here, it is in fact severe for many. A geographic depiction of the data shows that the smallest communities are most in need of markets.

Shelter & NFIs

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

or fund for 3000+ damaged homes

Approximately half the homes in Sinjar have been damaged or destroyed and according to survey participants no rebuilding assistance has been available in almost all communities. As a result, many families are unable to return to Sinjar while others live in insufficient shelter conditions. To encourage a migration of Yazidis back to their homes, they require funding assistance to rebuild. UNHABITAT maintains a list of damaged homes that could be used as an initial pool of beneficiaries.

TEMPORARY SHELTER FOR IDPS

Many of the Yazidis now residing in northern Sinjar are IDPs from the south side of the mountain. They stay in homes of families living in camps in KRI. Once families begin to return in greater frequency to Sinjar these IDPs will have fewer options for housing. A temporary solution must be created for IDP families who are unable to return to the south (until the area is deemed re-inhabitable).

BELOW

A child stands next to an open wall. Approximately half of all structures in Sinjar were damaged in the conflict



Education

ATTENTION TO TEACHER SALARIES

Providing teacher salaries is the greatest concern for re-establishing education in Sinjar. Almost all survey participants and those interviewed for this report emphasized the dearth of teachers in the region and cited the lack of salaries as a primary reason. Although there is a slow process of rebuilding schools, the buildings will sit empty without a support staff. It is recommended that aid is provided to pay teacher salaries in full for one year with financial responsibilities gradually transferred to local authorities in year two.

REBUILDING OF 31 SCHOOLS

(that have remained closed without assistance)

In the last few years a number of schools have been rebuilt but communities are still reporting that children must walk far to reach them. Therefore, it is recommended that more schools be built so that children can access education within a safe walking distance from home. Additionally, if Yazidis migrate from camps back to Sinjar, then the remaining 31 schools that have not received any reconstruction assistance will need attention.

DDR PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs are vital for youth in Sinjar. DDR programs have had proven benefits for former child soldiers in Africa and South America. The programs help youth to be de-educated from violent ideologies learned while serving in militias and to once again see positive futures. For children in Sinjar these types of program would be immensely beneficial. Many Yazidi children were forced to fight among IS militants, while others have joined arms with groups like the PKK. To help these children and work to end cycles of conflict, programming such as DDR or peace education are invaluable.

ENSURING SCHOOLS ARE OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED

Some schools in Sinjar have been set up by unofficial sources such as PKK leadership. These schools typically convey a general curriculum similar to officially sanctioned schools; however, do not provide children with the appropriate credentials to continue on to higher education if desired. To remedy this issue, local authorities and the PKK must negotiate a solution with encouragement from a third party.

Health

HIRING OF KEY SPECIALIZED STAFF

in women's care, surgery, pediatrics, etc.

Medical facilities in Sinjar presently only address minor health issues. Residents of the region have stated overwhelmingly that specialized care is widely unavailable and they must travel hours to other cities when they need services. This is particularly problematic for poor families that cannot afford the transportation and in the case of emergencies (when surgery may be required). Some women's health care is reported; however, services are limited. Women report being able to give birth in the area hospital but c-sections are only available in facilities far away. To improve on maternal health among a range of other issues, specialized care needs to be available in Sinjar.

CONSTRUCTION OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE HOSPITAL

Presently, there is only one hospital that services Sinjar. It is located in Sinuni and offers more comprehensive care than clinics in neighboring communities but cannot fulfill all the needs of the population. The hospital typically has a rotation of five doctors, with some residing in KRI. On average the hospital sees 500 patients/day and is severely understaffed and without appropriate supplies. The expansion of the Sinuni hospital or construction of a new facility (with adequate resources) would benefit health in the region.

ADDITION OF TWO MOBILE MEDICAL UNITS

One of the major inhibitors of health access is the unaffordability of transportation to medical facilities. Poor families in Sinjar noted the difficulty in traveling to the hospital or clinics due to the cost of transport. To remedy this issue, additional mobile medical units could be provided. One to two units have already been operating in the region but more could be useful.

Infrastructure

CONTINUATION OF UNDP'S ELECTRICITY PROJECT

BELOW
*Populated areas endured
the most destruction*

The status of the UNDP electrical project is unclear. Presently, power has reached communities on the edge of Sinjar but has yet to make it to Yazidi villages and collectives. UNDP may need additional support to complete this project and should be consulted on how best to bring power resources back to Sinjar.



DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE WATER PROGRAM OR BOREHOLES

Water has been a historic problem in Sinjar that has only grown worse since the crisis. As an agricultural region, the lack of water resources is especially problematic. The current methods for access involve transporting tanks of water via trucks to sell to Yazidis (private vendors). For poor families, this option is immensely difficult. Therefore, a comprehensive water solution is required. One solution that requires more investigation is to bring water from the mountain and install a more elaborate network of plumbing in the region. If this option proves too challenging, another option is to dig more boreholes to allow for well access.

Protection

CHILD NUTRITION PROGRAMS

The Sinuni hospital noted that 43% of child patients are malnourished. Given the current regional struggles with food security this is not unexpected. To ensure child health, programs must be established that offer them appropriate nutritional resources. Nutrition funding for families with children is an initial action that can be taken but actual food resources distributed to families in need may be the most effective solution.

DE-MINING CAMPAIGNS

Most areas on north side of the mountain have been de-mined of UXOs but the south side remains heavily in need of assistance. Although this report focuses on re-development of the north, it is essential to de-mine the south in order for IDPs to return home (vacating homes in the north). A wide scale de-mining campaign is critical for returns to the south side.

EXPANSION OF SOCIAL WORK PROGRAMS

Protection issues go underserved in Sinjar without dedicated attention. Some NGOs have begun working in this area but more work is required. It is imperative that as re-development occurs, protection principles are integrated into every response.

3.2 CONCLUSION

Years into the crisis and the Yazidi community is still struggling to gain appropriate assistance. Their homeland has been devastated and most continue to live in IDP camps. The population has been traumatized by the Islamic State and attention for their care has often been diverted to other regional crises like the humanitarian disaster in Mosul. Yazidis have endured genocide, displacement, and ongoing struggles to meet basic needs. The time is critical to support this population and affirm their human rights.

More specifically, Yazidis have a “right to return” according to international law. This right ensures that displaced populations can once again return to their homelands if they choose. To help facilitate Yazidis right to return, comprehensive assistance is needed for rebuilding facilities/infrastructure and restoring culture and life to the region.

To permanently resettle Sinjar it is recommended that work across multiple sectors occur. This report addresses six key sectors of concern, providing an overview of the needs and potential solutions in each sector going forward. Greater research into individual areas of concern is required to develop effective responses but a framework of action is provided.

” *As in the case of all displaced people, those unable to return to a former home because it is occupied or has been destroyed, or those who have lost property, are entitled to compensation. However, compensation is not a substitute for the right to return to the vicinity of a former home should that be one’s choice.*

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH



Annex I

Cost Estimates on Re-Development

LIVELIHOODS & FOOD SECURITY	EXPLANATION	COST
Agricultural redevelopment, including irrigation systems, farm equipment, etc.	To replenish livestock for 20,000 families (140,000 people) = 3 million USD Farming implements for large scale farms (supporting 10+ employees) = 2 million USD Irrigation system reconstruction (digging wells and plastic piping) = 11,000 USD/ farm. Recommended to rehabilitate 50 farms = 550,000 USD	5.5 million USD
Establishing more markets, especially in villages	Cost of establishing a mid-size grocery store or market (including rent, refrigeration, products, etc.)= 12,500 USD (recommended to open 10 more markets in villages)	125,000 USD
SHELTER & NFIS	EXPLANATION	COST
Financial assistance or fund for 3000+ damaged homes	UNHABITAT spent approximately 3000 USD to reconstruct each home. Multiply by 3000 damaged homes = 9 million USD	9 million USD
Temporary shelter for IDPs	No data	No data

**estimates prepared by Abid Shamdeen*

EDUCATION	EXPLANATION	COST
Attention to teacher salaries	58 original school, each with 15 teachers (average salary \$800) = 8.3 million USD for 1 year 4.2 million USD is required for second year as financial responsibilities are transferred	12.5 million USD
Rebuilding of 31 schools	Construction of one school is approximately 60,000 USD x 31 = 1.9 million USD	1.9 million USD
DDR programs for youth	1 trained specialist in each of 58 schools for 1 year + training/resources fees = 600,000 USD	600,000 USD
Ensuring schools are officially sanctioned	No cost	0
HEALTH		
Hiring of key specialized staff in women's care, surgery, pediatrics, etc.	Average specialist salary for a medical professional = 1400 USD/month. Hiring of ten specialists for 1 year= 168,000	170,000 USD
Construction of a more comprehensive hospital	Estimated at 400,000-500,000 USD for a new structure	500,000 USD
Addition of two mobile medical units	Cost of mobile unit and staff for 1 year= 137,000 USD (x2 for both units) Cost of support staff and upkeep for 1 year= 65,000 (x2 for both units)	400,000 USD
INFRASTRUCTURE		
Continuation of UNDP's electricity project Development of a comprehensive water program or boreholes	Continuation of UNDP projects in Sinjar require 5 million in additional funding. 10 Boreholes serving multiple communities= 1 million USD	6 million USD
PROTECTION		
Establishing child nutrition programs	27000 children currently reside in Sinjar and approximately half (13,500) are malnourished. For 50 USD/child each month they could receive proper nutritional services. A total of approximately 8M USD/year	8 million USD
De-mining campaigns	No data	No data
Expansion of social work programs	According to NGOs running social work programs, a team of five social workers with adequate training and resources costs approximately 20,000 USD/month. To have 20 social workers addressing protection issues across Sinjar the total would be approximately 1 million USD/ year	1 million USD

Annex II

The Sinjar Action Fund (SAF)

Nadia's advocacy work led her to meet people from around the world, including regional and global political leaders. She was frequently asked how governments and organization might help the Yazidis. Sadly, most leaders offered verbal support, but little material action. Political and situational constraints were blamed for inaction, and when aid came, it often failed to reach those in need. As a result, Nadia's frustration with the international community grew. She saw a lack of will by world leaders resulting in a lack of progress in helping the Yazidi community, including re-developing Sinjar. Thus, *Nadia's Initiative* developed the idea of "The Sinjar Action Fund." (SAF)

The situation in Sinjar is dire. The Yazidis face fatalities due to mines and systemically destroyed infrastructure as consequence of a ruthless genocide. Presently there are over 300,000 internally displaced Yazidis in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, mostly living in squalor in IDP camps with little of the basic human necessities. Only 70,000 have returned. Unless the Yazidis can return to their ancient homeland and make a life for themselves, ISIS's program of genocide will be a success.

However, if Sinjar is redeveloped and the Yazidi people can return, it will be a significant accomplishment with positive repercussions for the region and beyond. ISIS's aim of erasing the Yazidis from history must not only fail but backfire. We must establish mechanisms that not only prosecute genocide but undermine its effectiveness as a tactic. We owe it to future generations to establish successful examples of reconstruction, unity, and justice. Please help the SAF become a platform for the best aspects of the regional and international communities and, ultimately, a deterrent against future crimes.

What Is SAF?

So that the Yazidi people may return home as soon as possible, the SAF emphasizes humanitarian priorities and cooperation.

Nadia's outreach to many groups, regionally and internationally, has always sought unity. We hope the SAF will be looked at as an opportunity for the Baghdad central government and the KRG to coordinate in the long disputed territory of Sinjar. Baghdad and KRG's cooperation is essential for a successful reconstruction process. Yazidis of all political affiliations are invited to work together constructively. These terrible circumstances have made mutual support and compassion essential.

Who Is Part of SAF?

The SAF was initially organized in cooperation with the French government. The first priorities, described by President Macron, include a commitment to de-mining, which is already underway. However, the SAF is not limited to the French. The needs of the region are vast, and no one country could support the full re-development of Sinjar.

How Does SAF Work?

The SAF includes two categories of contributions.

1. Coalition of Commitments from Nation States

The SAF seeks commitments from nation states to allocate part of their reconstruction money for rebuilding Sinjar. The SAF will follow up on initial verbal commitments and report progress.

Because of Nadia's advocacy work, she has built a global platform to share findings, commend supporters, and encourage participants in meeting their commitments.

2. Fund operated by Nadia's Initiative

The Sinjar Action Fund is open to all nation-states, non-governmental organizations, and individuals of the international community willing to contribute directly to the SAF. Funds given to *Nadia's Initiative* will be allocated to advocacy and reconstruction projects based on our assessment and further investigations of the issue.



Nadia`s
INITIATIVE

2018

www.nadiasinitiative.org